Supreme Court Rejects "Freakish" Rule, Expands Title VII Retaliation Protections
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The U.S. Supreme Court ruled yesterday that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision’s protection extends to an employee who answers questions during an employer’s internal investigation.
The case, Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville (January 26, 2009) involved an employee (Crawford) who, in the course of an internal investigation into rumors of sexual harassment by the school district's employee relations director (Hughes), reported that Hughes had sexually harassed her. The employer took no action against Hughes, but soon fired Crawford for alleged embezzlement.
Crawford sued, claiming that the employer retaliated againt for her report of Hughes’s behavior in violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision (42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a)), which makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any . . . employe[e]” who (1) “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”(opposition clause), or (2) “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter” (participation clause). The court granted the employer summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the opposition clause demanded “active, consistent” opposing activities, whereas Crawford had not initiated any complaint prior to the investigation; and finding that the participation clause did not cover the employer's internal investigation because it was not conducted pursuant to a Title VII charge pending with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the anti-retaliation provision’s protection extends not only to employees who speak out about discrimination not on their own initiative, but also those who answer questions during an employer’s internal investigation. The court reasoned that because “oppose” is undefined by the statute, it carries its ordinary dictionary meaning of resisting or contending against, and includes taking no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Thus, a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s questions. The court concluded that nothing in the statute requires a "freakish" rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when asked a question.
For Florida employers, Crawford is not groundbreaking, as the Eleventh Circuit had already indicated (if not expressly held) that an employee's participation in his employer's internal investigation is protected activity under the opposition clause of Title VII. See EEOC v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000). But Crawford does clarify this point of law, and also makes clear that answering questions in the course of an investigation can constitute "opposition" just as surely as a complaint that triggers an internal investigation.
On the other hand, Crawford does not change the rule in the Eleventh Circuit that to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the opposition clause of Title VII, a plaintiff must show that she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices. This standard has both a subjective and an objective component. A plaintiff must not only show that she subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that her employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that her belief was objectively reasonable. See Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division, 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997).
